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Visibility in most wilderness areas in the northeastern United States has 
declined substantially since the 1970s.  As noted by Hill et al. (2000), despite 
the 1977 Clean Air Act and subsequent amendments, human induced smog 
conditions are becoming increasingly worse.  Average visibility in class I air-
sheds, such as the Great Gulf Wilderness in New Hampshire’s White Moun-
tains, is now about one-third of natural conditions. 
A particular concern is that deregulation of electricity production could 
result in further degradation because consumers may switch to lower cost 
fossil fuel generation (Harper 2000).  To the extent that this system reduces 
electricity costs, it may also affect firm location decisions (Halstead and Del-
ler 1997).  Yet, little is known about the extent to which consumers are likely 
to make tradeoffs between electric bills and reduced visibility in nearby wil-
derness areas. 
This applied research uses a contingent valuation approach in an em-
pirical case study of consumers’ tradeoffs between cheaper electric bills and 
reduced visibility in New Hampshire’s White Mountains.  We also examine 
some of the problems associated with uncertainty with this type of analysis; 
that is, how confident respondents are in their answers to the valuation ques-
tions. Finally, policy implications of decreased visibility due to electricity 
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2.  Background 
 
Deregulation of electricity markets, in spite of the events of recent years 
in California, has been moving forward on the policy agenda.  As Burtraw, 
Krupnick, and Palmer (1996: 7) note, the "natural monopoly" status of this 
utility is being eroded by technological change: 
 
“Because new, cleaner plants are not expected to dominate the indus-
try for some time, there is concern about increased use of existing fa-
cilities….most often by states in the Northeast, who fear that more 
open access to electricity transmissions will increase coal-fired genera-
tion in the mideast.” 
 
Moves toward deregulation are also fueled by the notion that the current 
system does not serve to keep prices low enough (Ando and Palmer 1998).  
Not surprisingly, the states which have some of the highest electricity costs 
in the country are those which are moving toward deregulation, including 
New Hampshire.   
If deregulation does indeed lead to increased coal-fired electricity pro-
duction in the Mideast, significant air quality deterioration in the Northeast 
could  result.  Simulations by Palmer and Burtraw (1996) confirm that in-
creased power generation in the Midwest and MidAtlantic states would con-
tribute to increased loading of atmospheric pollutants over the Northeast.  
These results are consistent with prevailing weather patterns which tend to 
sweep atmospheric pollutants toward and over New England (NERA 2001), 
leading to the region's unfortunate moniker of "the tailpipe of the United 
States." 
A closely related impact of deregulation is that in competitive markets 
electricity producers have less incentive to promote energy efficiency pro-
grams.  The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (created under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement) recently reported that North Ameri-
can power companies reduced energy efficiency programs by 42 percent dur-
ing 1995-1999, in part because of deregulated markets.  As a result, air pollu-
tion has increased in the Northeast (Vaughan et al. 2002; Reuters 2002).  
Moreover, while the full impacts of the current administration’s air pollution 
policies are subject to debate, further increases in pollution may well be 
likely under the Bush administration’s proposal that would relax air pollu-
tion rules when electric utilities are repaired or expanded.  For example, the 
so-called “Clear Skies Initiative (CSI)” will likely increase pollution due to its 
elimination of New Source Review (SO2 [a major culprit in visibility reduc-
tion], NOx, Hg, CO2, PM, and others) , though the decrease in pollutants 
from other CSI programs may offset this increase.  CSI removes current 
Clean Air Act protections regarding transported pollution, so even if it re-
duces pollution overall, pollution may not be reduced where it most impacts 
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New Hampshire.  There are provisions in place in the current Clean Air Act 
regarding visibility (e.g., Best Available Retrofit Technology) which CSI re-
moves, so arguably the current Clean Air Act would improve visibility more 
than CSI (Environmental Integrity Project 2003; Colburn 2003). 
Actual events will depend, in part, on how consumers respond to de-
regulation.  Yet, there is very little information available about the tradeoffs 
individuals have already made between cheaper electricity from deregula-
tion and environmental factors, such as atmospheric visibility.  A major rea-
son for this is that electricity deregulation is a relatively new phenomenon 
that has not been fully implemented in many regions of the nation.  Ethier et 
al. (2000) note that actual sign-up rates for so called “green” electricity have 
generally been below 2 percent.  However, at this time the only way to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of tradeoffs is to employ stated prefer-
ence methods that ask individuals about tradeoffs they are likely to make. 
There are several types of stated preference techniques that might be 
used to examine consumer tradeoffs between electricity bills and environ-
mental factors.  The traditional contingent valuation method, CVM, has been 
widely used to value many types of money/environmental quality tradeoffs 
(Mitchell and Carson 1989).  In this approach, individuals are generally 
asked if they would be willing to pay (WTP) a certain dollar amount to avoid 
a stated level of reduction in some aspect of environmental quality.  A will-
ingness to accept (WTA) format can also be used wherein respondents are 
asked, for example, whether they would accept a given environmental qual-
ity reduction in exchange for a specified reduction in their monthly electric-
ity bill.  While many economists and policymakers prefer the WTP approach, 
there are several reasons why information about WTA may be useful in the 
situation examined in this study.  First, from a theoretical perspective, prop-
erty rights to a clean environment are often assumed to belong to the public, 
and consequently environmental losses should be evaluated using a WTA 
measure (Harper 2000).  And if, as suggested by Kahneman et al. (1990), in-
dividuals value losses more highly than gains, willingness to pay estimates 
could severely understate value.  Second, given deregulation of electricity 
generation, acceptance of an increase in air pollution in exchange for cheaper 
electricity is a very realistic scenario given that electricity generated by coal-
fired plants in the Ohio River Valley tends to generate plumes which eventu-
ally impact the White Mountains.  However, for this study the WTP measure 
of consumer surplus was used, as previous attempts to use the WTA meas-
ure to study the issue revealed problems with model stability and insuffi-
cient variation in response (e.g., see Stevens et al. 2000).   
Most previous studies of the value of visibility in wilderness (or remote) 
areas have used the traditional contingent valuation method (CVM) to focus 
on mean or median WTP, in dollar terms, to maintain visibility.  One of the 
first studies was conducted by Rowe et al. (1980) who found that non-
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residents were willing to pay about $4 per day to preserve visual range in 
southwestern Colorado.  Schulze et al. (1983) reported that residents of Los 
Angeles, Denver, Albuquerque and Chicago were willing to pay $3.75 to 
$5.14 per month to preserve visibility in the Grand Canyon.  Crocker and 
Shogren (1991) estimated that residents were willing to pay about $3.00 per 
day to preserve visibility in the Cascades of Washington State.  And, Chest-
nut and Rowe (1990) found that respondents were willing to pay $4.35 per 
month to avoid a change in average levels of visibility in the Grand Canyon, 
Yosemite and Shenandoah National Parks.2   
We suggest, however, that from a public policy perspective, WTP or 
WTA "values" may often be of relatively little use.  What actually counts is 
more likely to be the proportion of the relevant population that favors a pro-
posed policy.  In the case of electricity deregulation, we believe that the most 
relevant issue is not the mean or median amount people are willing to pay.  
Rather, the percentage of people who would likely trade pollution for ex-
penditures on power determines the actual outcome of deregulated markets.  
And, in the political arena, decisions are often made on the basis of the num-
ber of voters favoring a given proposition, not the aggregate WTP or WTA 
value.  Consequently, the following case study focuses primarily on the pro-
portion of individuals who would likely pay higher electric bills to avoid 
degraded visibility.  We do, however, present median WTP estimates for 
comparative purposes. 
 
3. Case Study Methods 
 
A case study of visibility/electricity cost tradeoffs in the Great Gulf Wil-
derness in New Hampshire was undertaken during summer of 2000.  Visibil-
ity in the study area, which is about one quarter mile northeast of the Mt. 
Washington summit, is commonly impaired by regional haze that is largely a 
product of fossil fuel energy production (Hill et al. 2000). 
A stated preference survey was used to measure electric bill/visibility 
tradeoffs in the Great Gulf Wilderness region.  Computer modeled images 
derived from the WinHaze Visual Air Quality Program allowed us to hold 
weather conditions constant (primarily cloud cover) while changing visibil-
ity and electric bills only.  The survey was conducted by mail of a random 
sample of 1,000 residents of northern New England (New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, and Maine).  The survey sought to estimate respondents’ willingness 
to pay (using the CVM method) to avoid degradation of visibility.   
The first section of all surveys asked respondents to rate according to 
"acceptability" four pictures with different amounts of haze in each.  Each 
picture was a view taken from Camp Dodge, directly across from the Great 
                                                 
2 Many of these studies were modeled after research and ideas developed or presented at a 1982 
conference on visual values (Rowe and Chestnut 1983). 
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Gulf Wilderness that had been altered by WinHaze to simulate different lev-
els of atmospheric pollution, all else held constant (cloud cover, etc.).   
The CVM question was then presented.  Following an introductory 
statement about electricity deregulation and air quality in the White Moun-
tains (see appendix), each respondent viewed two pictures in this section.  
Picture A represented the status quo visibility and the individual’s current 
electric bill while picture B represented reduced visibility with the option to 
pay to avoid this visibility loss and incur a higher electric bill.  The question 
was asked as follows: 
 
Would you be willing to pay $x per month more for electricity to 
avoid this new level of visibility (indicated by Picture B) in the 
White Mountain National Forest? 
 
In all cases, picture A, which represented the base scenario, or status 
quo, described the actual average visibility level at the site during the sum-
mer months (about 90 miles).  Picture B represented one of four visual range 
reductions (visual range of 30, 20, 7.3 or 4.4 miles). Respondents to the sur-
vey were confronted with cost increases ranging from $10 to $50 per month 
(these values were chosen based on the results of a similar survey conducted 
in the region the previous year). 
A series of follow-up questions were asked to obtain information about 
each respondent’s socio-economic characteristics, motives involved in an-
swering the tradeoff question, and plans, if any, to visit the wilderness area 
in the future.  Double wave mailings with postcard follow-ups resulted in 
response rates of approximately 39 percent, slightly below average for aca-
demic surveys of the general population (Mitchell and Carson 1989). 
 
4. Results  
 
Characteristics of individuals responding to each survey are summarized 
in Table 1.  Given the relatively low response rate of the survey, questions of 
non-response bias and sample representativeness must be addressed if any 
generalizations are to be made from the study.  The sample mean annual 
income of $49,500 is close to the weighted census data for the region of 
$52,265, while the average respondent age of 51 compares with a weighted 
average of 47.8 years for the region.   Thus, at least for these characteristics, 
the sample appears comparable to the general population of the area.   
All respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 10, how certain 
they were of their answer to the WTP question (a 10 indicated very certain 
while a 1 indicated very uncertain).  Two WTP logit models were estimated 
(Table 2).  The dependent variable in the first model equaled 1 if the respon-
dent answered yes to the WTP question while the dependent variable in the 
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second model equaled 1 if the respondent answered yes to the WTP question 
and gave a certainty rating of 8, 9, or 10. 
 
Table 1.  Logit Model WTP Specification 
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As indicated in Table 1, about 33 percent of respondents answered yes to 
the CVM question, but only 17 percent were relatively certain about their 
“yes” response. Empirical studies which compare actual payments to hypo-
thetical payments have established a firm relationship between actual pay-
ment and stated certainty.  It would certainly be appropriate for policymak-
ers to consider that imposing a “certainty” constraint on the results reduces 
support for the policy by nearly half.  We expected the likelihood that an in-
dividual would be willing to pay to avoid reduced visibility would decrease 
with the payment asked for, would be less if the visibility is relatively good, 
and would increase with income and planned future visits to the site. 
Model results are presented in Table 2.  As expected, the probability of 
payment decreased with the dollar amount elicited, and with high levels of 
visibility.  Median dollar values of WTP were computed by first calculating 
the probability of payment by: 
                          -( +Bx)
1
Pr  = 
1+e a
                                                          (1)
  
where Pr is probability, a is the estimated intercept, B is a vector of the esti-
mated coefficients, and x is a vector of the independent variables given in 
Table 2.  The mean value of each independent variable was used in equation 
(1), except for the value of WTP.  Given this formulation, the value of WTP 
which results in Pr = .5 is the median value of WTP for the "average" respon-
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dent in dollars.  As shown in Table 2 , the estimated median WTP values are 
generally consistent with previous WTP estimates for atmospheric visibility 
in remote areas.  Zhao and Kling (2001) argue that these WTP estimates may 
be understated if individuals are uncertain of the value of a good.    In es-
sence, they argue that respondents forced to make a decision on the spot 
demand compensation for this loss of quasi-option value (Arrow and Lind, 
1972), and produce WTP bids less than their expected value of the good so as 
to insure not “overpaying.”  Champ et al. (1997) note that for goods with 
substantial public good characteristics, actual donations may be underesti-
mates of the full value of a good to the respondent due to free rid-
ing/strategic behavior.  Due to the well-known warm glow phenomenon 
and other problems (Andreoni 1989), others have argued that CVM may 
overestimate “true” values.   Goldar and Misra (2001) attribute much of the 
disparity to the familiar hypothetical bias problem.   
 
Table 2.  Logit Model WTP Results 
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*** significant at .01 level 
** significant at .05 level 
* significant at .10 level 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The findings that emerge from this study can be summarized as follows.  
First, most respondents were not willing to pay higher electricity rates in ex-
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change for increased visibility over the range examined in this study.  If re-
spondents are well informed, we might therefore infer that deregulation 
could possibly result in decreased visibility as a result of greater household 
demand for the cheapest source of electricity.  Thus, based strictly on the ref-
erendum side of the study, avoided visibility losses are not sufficient to cause 
most respondents to pay more for electricity.  This effect is especially pro-
nounced when one considers only those fairly certain of their responses.  It is 
important to note that some of the respondents may have been effectively 
engaging in protest behavior—that is, they valued the loss in visibility, but 
were unwilling to pay higher electric fees (possibly because they felt they 
had the “right” to the status quo and should not have to pay to preserve it).  
A section of the survey which asked respondents to rate photographs with 
varying degrees of visibility found that they consistently rated those with 
visibility ranges below 30 kilometers “unacceptable.”   
However, if policymakers respond simply to estimates of willingness to 
pay, programs to preserve visibility in the mountains might more likely be 
supported due to the median estimates of $3 – 12/month which respondents 
would pay in increased electric bills.  This points out a conundrum in inter-
preting contingent valuation studies within a policy framework. 
The results (referendum vs. median values) are not necessarily contradic-
tory.  In provision of public goods, it is well known that individuals may 
place radically different values on the same level of a public good.  If true 
benefits (Lindahl) pricing were used, each would pay according to utility 
gained.  In reality, benefits received are often at odds with payments made 
(via general funds, etc.).  A policy could pass the net benefits test with a ma-
jority of individuals opposing it.   
From the perspective of regional policy initiatives, provision of informa-
tion about the likely consequences of purchasing cheaper power in deregu-
lated markets is therefore of particular importance.  That is, if people are 
aware of the visibility tradeoffs associated with purchase of deregulated 
power, this research suggests that the policy chosen will depend on how the 
results are interpreted.   
From the perspective of regional economies, it is possible that there 
could be measurable effects of lost visibility to local business activity.  Those 
respondents planning future visits were less likely to accept reduced visibil-
ity and were more likely to be willing to pay to avoid reduced visibility.  
Surveys conducted on site indicate that the “average” visitor will make .91 
fewer trips per year due to decreased visibility.  This could result in spend-
ing losses ranging from about $21,700 to $116,214 for the sample of about 200 
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Introduction to Valuation Questions 
 
For the next question, consider the following: Currently, many states are 
debating the issue of deregulation in the electric utility industry.  If deregula-
tion occurs in your state, you may be able to choose your own power pro-
vider.  Assume for the purposes of this question that cheaper power (that is, 
less than what you currently pay) is available through a Mid-western power 
company.  Further, this power company produces electricity by burning coal.  
Increased demand for this company's cheaper power will contribute to air 
pollution and poor visibility in the White Mountains. 
Now suppose picture A represents the level of visibility most often ex-
perienced in this region during the summer months.  Further suppose that 
you were faced with a situation where the visibility level would change to 
that in picture B.  The purposes of this question assume that visibility would 
change ONLY in the White Mountain National Forest. 
 
